Stags in the Wild
Stags in the Wild
A broad category where Coordination Markets have particular utility is escaping network effect traps — apps that “suck but everyone’s using them,” media platforms that are blatantly lying but everyone’s watching. CMs allow the public’s true preference to materialize as concrete switching plans. In formal terms, they aggregate demand and alter the focality.
Liquidity Migration
Superior DeFi machinery often exists but liquidity is stuck on legacy tech — $5.7B on BNB, for instance. LPs don’t move because moving alone means providing liquidity to an empty pool.
With Coordination Markets, each LP sets a personal threshold for migrating — $5M, $50M, $500M — whatever they need to feel comfortable. Their capital stays productive on BNB until a qualifying subset’s thresholds are met and resolved.
The same capital can back multiple campaigns to exit BNB — to Solana, Kaspa, or other destinations. Individual intendos can double-sign conflicting hunts, and whatever triggers first applies. This is capital multiplexing in action.
Why This Is Different from a Bridge
Bridges move capital between chains after you’ve decided. Coordination Markets solve the decision problem — they tell you “yes, enough people are coming with you” before anyone moves. The execution is atomic: either the whole LP migration happens, or nobody’s funds budge.
Content Platform Bootstrap
Netflix and Disney+ push a particular editorial agenda, and large segments of the user base — parents, in particular — resent it. Alternative platforms exist (HBO, Amazon), but not optimized for family content.
As a concerned parent, you need to know that the other people ranting on the internet are willing to actually act, not just complain. Entrepreneurs face the same obscurity from the other side: if I launch a streaming service with a different editorial stance, how many of those ranting parents will actually subscribe?
This is a pure coordination failure, solvable by CMs: Users intendo-commit subscription fees to a new platform. Provided a sufficient number join, the platform launches and charges. If the threshold isn’t met, nobody pays.
The entrepreneur gets a credible demand signal before investing in content. Users get an assurance that they won’t be alone on an empty platform.
More Stags
Collective Bargaining
Workers at distributed companies can’t coordinate a raise request without exposing individual signalers. CMs let each employee intendo a demand conditioned on N colleagues doing the same. Opacity protects individuals; atomicity delivers collective power.
Protocol Governance
Token-weighted voting suffers from low turnout and whale dominance. CMs enable conditional votes: “I vote for proposal X if 10,000 other token holders do.” The threshold ensures the vote only materializes with genuine consensus.
Open Source Funding
Developers commit to contributing if a project reaches a funding threshold. Sponsors commit funds if enough developers sign. Two-sided intendos compose into a single hunt — funding and labor deploy simultaneously.
Social Movements
Signing a public letter is risky if few others follow. CMs let signatories commit privately, with atomic publication only when the list is large enough to provide safety in numbers. DVPs let participants verify to close friends without public exposure.
The Pattern
All of these share the same structure:
- Shared preference exists — people want to coordinate
- Moving alone is risky — first movers bear disproportionate cost
- Communication isn’t enough — cheap talk doesn’t create binding commitments
- Coordination Markets solve it — conditional commitments, opaque accumulation, atomic execution
Wherever this pattern appears, a Stag can be posted and a Pack can form.
| Read the full thesis → | How the mechanism works → |